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INTRODUCTION 
The five coastal States (Canada, Denmark on behalf of Greenland, Norway, 
the Russian Federation, and the United States) have been concerned with 
establishing that the Arctic Ocean is subject to the law of the sea.1 Further, they 
have assumed and recognized a special responsibility for the protection and 
preservation of the marine environment of the Arctic Ocean. They have described 
it as “stewardship.” The stewardship role is not restricted to the waters under their 
national jurisdiction. It includes the Arctic Ocean and its unique ecosystem, which 
encompasses areas within and beyond national jurisdiction. 
* Tore Henriksen, Professor, K.G. Jebsen Centre for the Law of the Sea, Faculty of Law, University of
Tromsø—the Arctic University of Norway, tore.henriksen@uit.no. 
1. Ilulissat Declaration, May 28, 2008, 48 I.L.M. 362.
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The history of stewardship can be traced to the Old Testament and to 
indigenous communities.2 The concept does not have a single definition. There are 
several versions of the concept describing different forms of responsible 
management of natural resources.3 It has been reinterpreted by environmental 
ethics to accommodate new understandings of the relationship between human 
beings and nature.4 
The claim of an environmental stewardship role may have raised some 
eyebrows.5 It could give the impression that the coastal States are claiming some 
kind of exclusivity or proprietary rights over the Arctic Ocean and its resources. 
Under the law of the sea (as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea, hereafter UNCLOS), non-Arctic States enjoy rights and 
freedoms (fishing, shipping, and marine scientific research) on the high seas and 
within the maritime zones of coastal States in the Arctic Ocean.6 The reference to 
the law of the sea as well as international law in the Ilulissat Declaration suggests 
that this is not such an attempt. It rather implies that the concept is integrated in 
UNCLOS or at least does not conflict with it. The objective of this Article is to 
investigate the possible status of stewardship under UNCLOS. A variety of actors 
at different levels from landowners and corporations to indigenous peoples and 
local communities may be ascribed a stewardship role. This Article will investigate 
the stewardship role of States, coastal States, and non-coastal States in the 
conservation of natural resources and protecting the environment of the oceans. 
An environmental stewardship suggests that States have a responsibility to act 
on behalf of a greater community—that of present and future generations. The 
concept certainly has ethical and political meaning. The question to be addressed in 
this Article is whether the concept has some legal implications, and whether it adds 
any substance to the obligations under UNCLOS. It is asserted that it at least 
provides some legal guidance in the decision-making of States at the national and 
international level.7 
In the following sections, an attempt to scope the concept of environmental 
stewardship will be undertaken (Section I) before investigating its status under the 
law of the sea (Section II). Prior to concluding (Section 5), this Article will examine 
to what extent stewardship has been undertaken by the coastal States and other 
States in the Arctic Ocean (Section III). 
 
2. Richard Worrell & Michael C. Appleby, Stewardship of Natural Resources: Definition, Ethical and 
Practical Aspects, 12 J. AGRIC. & ENVTL. ETHICS 263, 264–65 (2000). 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. LILLY WEIDEMANN, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE ARCTIC MARINE 
ENVIRONMENT: WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON HIGH SEAS FISHERIES 59 (2014). 
6. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 17, 58, 87, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
7. Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: On the Accountability of States to Foreign 
Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295, 314–26 (2013). 
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I. ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP 
A brief description of environmental stewardship is necessary in order to 
assess its applicability and relevance to the law of the sea. Stewardship is a metaphor 
used for someone exercising authority on behalf of someone else.8 Different 
concepts have been used to describe such a role, including public trusteeship, 
guardianship, custodianship, and agency.9 The stewardship role or similar concepts 
have primarily been used in common law systems.10 It has been used to describe 
management of common natural resources by government on behalf of the 
community.11 These resources may include riverbeds, fish, forests, and 
groundwater.12 
The concept is generally described as a responsibility or duty to treat a valuable 
or scarce resource with a certain degree of care through the use of control or 
dominion, based on some values for the benefit of someone.13 It is a concept that 
“seeks to achieve certain identifiable social objectives through the manipulation of 
the bundle of rights and duties that constitute property.”14 These objectives may 
include public interests such as satisfying basic human needs.15 Stewardship may 
expand to include protection of biodiversity, sustainability, responsible use, and 
conservation of the resources in respect of not only present generations but also 
future generations and nature.16 Stewardship is not the exercise of proprietary rights 
but rather of fiduciary obligations.17 What makes stewardship distinctive is the duty 
to conserve and the duty to preserve.18 
Stewardship includes the following elements: the object of the responsibility 
(what), the duty holder (who), the beneficiaries (for whom), and the values to be 
promoted through the stewardship (for what).19 The identification of the object of 
the responsibility determines the nature of the stewardship. Environmental 
stewardship would include properties of common interest such as the climate, living 
marine resources, rivers, and ecosystems. They are common natural resources in the 
 
8. Worrell & Appleby, supra note 2, at 266. 
9. Peter H. Sand, Public Trusteeship for the Oceans, in LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 521, 534–35 (Tafsir M. Ndiaye & Rüdiger Wolfrum eds., 2007). 
10. Mary Turnipseed et al., Using Public Trust Doctrine to Achieve Ocean Stewardship, in RULE OF 
LAW FOR NATURE: NEW DIMENSIONS AND IDEAS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 365, 367–68 (Christina 
Voigt ed. 2013) (discussing stewardship as a core element of the “public trust doctrine”). 
11. Id. at 367. 
12. Id. 
13. Mark Shepheard & Paul Martin, The Political Discourse of Land Stewardship Reframed as a Statutory 
Duty, in ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSES IN PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 71, 76–77 (Brad 
Jessup & Kim Rubenstein eds., 2012). 
14. RICHARD BARNES, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NATURAL RESOURCES 297 (2009). 
15. Id. 
16. Worrell & Appleby, supra note 2, at 269–70. 
17. Peter H. Sand, Sovereignty Bounded: Public Trusteeship for Common Pool Resources?, 4 GLOBAL 
ENVTL. POL. 47, 48 (2004). 
18. BARNES, supra note 14, at 157. 
19. Emily Barritt, Conceptualising Stewardship in Environmental Law, 26 J. ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (2014). 
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sense that they are “a subject of public concern to the whole people . . . .”20 These 
are resources that cannot be subjected to ownership or sovereignty. The scope of 
stewardship may vary from parts of the environment, such as a river, to the whole 
environment and even the planet.21 The duty holders are those in control of the 
object or in the best position to steward it. At the international level, the duty 
holders would include States competent to regulate the activities of their nationals 
and others by exercising their territorial sovereignty, sovereign rights over natural 
resources, and jurisdiction over their vessels and nationals. There are three possible 
groups of beneficiaries of environmental stewardship: current generations, future 
generations, and the environment.22 Where common natural resources are the 
object, the beneficiaries logically include future generations. These natural resources 
are necessary for fulfilling their needs. There is an obvious parallel to the concept 
of sustainable development.23 The identification of beneficiaries is important to 
ensure that the duties are complied with. Ideally, the beneficiaries may take action 
to challenge decisions.24 The exercise of stewardship within the international legal 
framework requires the international community of States to represent the interests 
and values of the beneficiaries. States will have a double role. Stewardship is a 
constellation of rights and duties. Environmental stewardship is, in essence, 
representing anthropocentric values. It is about how humans are to use their 
dominion for the benefit of present and future generations. Therefore, the concept 
is criticized for implying a separation between humans and nature.25 By including 
the environment as a beneficiary, stewardship will include ecocentric elements. The 
steward is then required to take into consideration the intrinsic value of all living 
organisms irrespective of their usefulness or importance to human beings. 
II. ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A. Introduction 
Stewardship has an obvious role in environmental ethics. The concept is 
seldom used in international legal instruments. Other concepts are used to describe 
the responsibilities of the community of States for protecting the environment and/
or its resources for the benefit of a particular group.26 Examples include the 
 
20. MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW 
ECOLOGICAL AGE 144 (2014) (quoting Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892)). 
21. Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable Development, 8 AM. U. 
J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 19, 20 (1992). 
22. Barritt, supra note 19, at 6–9. 
23. Turnipseed et al., supra note 10, at 368–69. 
24. Sand, supra note 17, at 56–57. 
25. Clare Palmer, Stewardship: A Case Study in Environmental Ethics, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
STEWARDSHIP: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES—PAST AND PRESENT, 63, 70–74 (R.J. Berry ed., 2006); 
Worrell & Appleby, supra note 2, at 271–72. 
26. PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 234 
(Cambridge University Press, 3d ed. 2012) (1995). 
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International Whaling Commission, which is charged with “safeguarding for future 
generations the great natural resources represented by the whale stocks.”27 The 
conservation of biological diversity and “change in the Earth’s climate and its 
adverse effects are a common concern of humankind.”28 The common concern 
concept can be seen as a response to the “globalization of environmental 
concerns . . . .”29 
These examples indicate that there is a common responsibility or interest for 
States to care for nature for the benefit of humankind. Humankind includes both 
present and future generations. The need for common responsibility is particularly 
present where a natural resource is not subject to the sovereign rights of a single 
State or where there is need for global cooperation to address a global 
environmental problem.30 Like climate change, it is difficult to trace back 
environmental harm to the actions of specific States and collective action is 
necessary.31 Such common responsibility is most clearly articulated in the only 
Arctic-specific environmental treaty, the 1973 Polar Bear Agreement. The 
contracting parties recognized “the special responsibilities and special interests of 
the States of the Arctic Region in relation to the protection of the fauna and flora 
of the Arctic Region.”32 The common responsibility stems from the fact that the 
polar bear is not subjected to the sovereignty of one State but is shared between 
these States. 
Edith Brown-Weiss has formulated the common responsibility as a theory of 
intergenerational equity, which 
states that we, the human species, hold the natural environment of our 
planet in common with other species, other people, and with past, present 
and future generations. As members of the present generation, we are both 
trustees, responsible for the robustness and integrity of our planet, and 
beneficiaries, with the right to use and benefit from it for ourselves.33 
Is there use or benefit to introducing “environmental stewardship” into 
 
27. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling pmbl., Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 
T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 74. 
28. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change pmbl., May 9, 1992, 1771 
U.N.T.S. 107; see Convention on Biological Diversity pmbl., June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79. 
29. Jutta Brunnée, The Stockholm Declaration and the Structure and Processes of International 
Environmental Law, in THE FUTURE OF OCEAN REGIME-BUILDING: ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO DOUGLAS 
M. JOHNSTON 41, 45 (Aldo Chircop et al. eds., 2009). 
30. PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 129–30, (3d 
ed. 2009); Yoshifumi Tanaka, Protection of Community Interests in International Law: The Case of the Law 
of the Sea, in 15 MAX PLANCK YEARBOOK OF UNITED NATIONS LAW 329, 335–36 (A. von Bogdandy 
& R. Wolfrum eds., 2011). 
31. Jutta Brunnée, Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 550, 553 (Daniel Bodansky et 
al. eds., 2007). 
32. Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears pmbl., Nov. 15, 1973, T.I.A.S. No.  
8409, 27 U.S.T. 3918. 
33. Weiss, supra note 21, at 20. 
 
66 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:61 
 
international environmental law? Is it not covered by a “common concern of 
mankind” or a similar concept? Moreover, does it have any normative content or 
function?34 It has been described as an approach supporting a responsibility towards 
the environment.35 The environmental stewardship concept clearly includes the 
legal responsibility of States to take action to address these common concerns. The 
common concern concept is a “participation rule” recognizing the legal interest or 
standing of States regarding a particular environmental problem.36 Further, the 
stewardship concept displays the different roles of States in protecting the 
environment: on one side the responsibility of taking care of nature, and on the 
other side a beneficiary serving in the capacity as a user of the natural resources and 
having a legitimate interest in maintaining the intrinsic values of nature. Without a 
fixed content, stewardship may function as a collective legal term covering the 
different types of collective responsibilities of States with respect to the 
environment. Even if it does not have a separate legal meaning, it may have an 
important guiding function. Identifying areas of environmental stewardship will 
assist in clarifying the scope of legitimate interests of other States (beneficiaries)—
in compliance with the responsibility to protect and preserve the environment. 
B. Environmental Stewardship and the Law of the Sea 
The relevance of environmental stewardship with respect to UNCLOS relates 
to whether States have common or collective responsibility on behalf of a larger 
community to protect the marine environment and to conserve its natural resources. 
Some indications of such responsibility may be found in its preamble, which sets 
out the goals and purposes of UNCLOS. It stresses the importance of UNCLOS 
to the “progress for all peoples of the world.”37 Further, the close connections 
between the problems of the oceans and the need for them to be considered as a 
whole are recognized.38 Therefore, the purpose of UNCLOS is to establish “a legal 
order for the seas” that, inter alia, will promote conservation of their living marine 
resources and the protection and preservation of the marine environment.39 This 
suggests that UNCLOS is an exercise of stewardship in a broad sense as States 
recognize their common responsibility for an orderly utilization of the seas and for 
the protection of the environment and natural resources for the benefit of all 
people. 
 
34. Vaughan Lowe, Sustainable Development and Unsustainable Arguments, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 
AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE CHALLENGES 19, 31 (Alan 
Boyle & David Freestone eds., 1999). 
35. BARNES, supra note 14, at 155. 
36. Brunnée, supra note 29, at 55. 
37. UNCLOS, supra note 6, pmbl. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
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C. Common Heritage of Mankind 
In the following, a more in-depth investigation will be made of the parts 
relating to living marine resources and protection and preservation of the marine 
environment. First, the concept that perhaps is the most coherent regarding 
stewardship is the “common heritage of mankind.”40 The seabed and subsoil in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction, known as the Area, and its mineral resources 
comprise the common heritage of mankind.41 States are prohibited from making 
sovereignty claims to the Area or its mineral resources. The Area is a global 
commons similar to the high seas.42 
Contrary to the high seas and its resources, the rights to the mineral resources 
of the Area are represented by the Authority, an international organization set up 
under UNCLOS.43 All of its State parties are automatically members of the 
Authority.44 The Authority is charged with the role of exercising stewardship, as it 
is required to ensure that the activities are carried out for the benefit of all 
mankind.45 The stewardship is primarily directed at regulating access to, and the 
exploitation of, the mineral resources. It also includes managing the economic 
benefits derived from these activities.46 The Authority also regulates mining 
activities to protect the marine environment of the Area—its flora and fauna—from 
their harmful effects.47 UNCLOS provides for procedures to resolve disputes over 
the Authority’s exercise of competence.48 The beneficiaries, the State parties to 
UNCLOS, have thus been provided with procedures for ensuring that the Authority 
is exercising its responsibility for the benefit of mankind. 
D. Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment 
Do the environmental protection obligations of Part XII of UNCLOS, which 
cover activities other than deep seabed mining, provide for environmental 
stewardship, in light of the components described above? Part XII includes the 
traditional norm originating from the Trail Smelter case.49 States have an obligation 
“to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction or control . . . [do] not [] cause 
damage . . . to other States and their environment . . . or . . . spread beyond the areas 
where they exercise sovereign rights.”50 This obligation has been extended to 
 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at art. 136; cf. id. at arts. 1(1)(1), 133. 
42. Id. at art. 136; cf. id. at art. 89. 
43. Id. at art. 136; cf. id. at art. 157. 
44. Id. at art. 156(2). 
45. Id. at arts. 140(1), 153. 
46. Id. at arts. 140(2), 153. 
47. Id. at art. 145. 
48. Id. at arts. 186–191; cf. id. at pt. XV. 
49. Stuart B. Kaye, The Impact of the Trail Smelter Arbitration on the Law of the Sea, in 
TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 209, 217 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell  
A. Miller eds., 2006). 
50. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 194(2). 
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include areas where States enjoy sovereign rights and areas beyond national 
jurisdiction.51 
The 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment laid, as Jutta 
Brunnée describes, the “foundation for a shift in international environmental law 
from its predominant focus on trans-boundary pollution to a conceptual framework 
with a much broader outlook.”52 The complexity of the threats to the environment 
could not be adequately addressed by the traditional bilateral approaches.53 Principle 
24 of the Stockholm Declaration identified collective action as an essential means: 
Co-operation through multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other 
appropriate means is essential to effectively control, prevent, reduce and 
eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from activities conducted 
in all spheres, in such a way that due account is taken of the sovereignty 
and interests of all States.54 
Further, Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration underscored the “solemn 
responsibility [of man] to protect and improve the environment for present and 
future generations.”55 Taken together, these principles suggest an environmental 
stewardship role of States in addressing these global challenges. The ongoing 
negotiations on UNCLOS had already accepted the need for a broader approach to 
preservation of the marine environment.56 The negotiations were still influenced by 
the Stockholm conference.57 
The introductory section (Articles 192–196) of Part XII sets out the 
framework for the subsequent substantive provisions.58 The opening provision 
instructs States to protect and preserve the marine environment.59 The obligation is 
applicable to all States as a general principle of international law.60 The obligation 
to protect and preserve the marine environment is a broad and positive obligation 
that is framed as both an individual and a collective responsibility for the duty 
bearers, similar to stewardship. The positive aspect of the obligations following 
from the duty to preserve the environment is that they require States to also take 
measures to maintain and improve environmental quality.61 The object of the 
 
51. RACHAEL LORNA JOHNSTONE, OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE ARCTIC 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: RISK AND RESPONSIBILITY 51 (2015). 
52. Brunnée, supra note 29, at 42. 
53. See U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Declaration of the United Nations on the 
Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, Proclamation 7 ( June 5–16, 1972) [hereinafter 
Stockholm Declaration]. 
54. Id. at princ. 24. 
55. Id. at princ. 1. 
56. 7 CTR. FOR OCEANS LAW AND POLICY, UNIV. OF VA., UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY para. 192.3–192.4 (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eds., 
1995) [hereinafter Virginia Commentary]. 
57. Id. at paras. XII.11, 194.3–194.4. 
58. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at arts. 192–198. 
59. Id. at art. 192. 
60. Virginia Commentary, supra note 56, at para. 192.8. 
61. Id. at para. 192.9. 
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obligation, “marine environment,” is not defined. It necessarily includes the surface 
of the sea, possibly the air space above, the water column and the seabed, and their 
respective biological components (species, ecosystems, and habitats).62 The 
biological components are explicitly included in the specification of the obligations 
and the definition of pollution.63 These objects do not only include those with 
economic and other values to humans but also other components of the 
environment.64 The obligation is therefore applicable to all the marine space and its 
physical and biological components. This means that the object is not delimited by 
the territorial jurisdictions established under UNCLOS. The obligation is not 
restricted to transboundary activities or impacts.65 
The main focus of the obligation to protect and preserve the marine 
environment has been pollution from different sources.66 This is reflected in the 
substantive part of UNCLOS Part XII where States are instructed to prevent 
pollution of the marine environment from different sources, including from vessels 
and land-based activities.67 The obligations to conserve living marine resources are 
regulated in separate provisions.68 Consequently, UNCLOS has a sectoral approach. 
In recent years, marine environmental law has broadened to include the prevention 
of environmental degradation and protection of marine biodiversity, irrespective of 
cause. For example, in Agenda 21, one of the outputs of the Rio Conference on 
Environment and Development, there was a call for new approaches to 
management of the oceans.69 These approaches were to be integrated in content 
and precautionary in scope. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD),70 
adopted at the Rio Conference, and the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement (FSA)71 are 
some of the international instruments reflecting an understanding that protection 
and preservation of the marine environment is not only about preventing pollution. 
Other human activities affecting the environment, such as fishing, must be included 
in the obligation.72 Decisions by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas 
suggest that there is a development towards a more integrated concept of marine 
environmental protection. In its 2015 advisory opinion, the Tribunal established 
that “relevant conservation measures concerning living resources enacted by the 
 
62. Id. at para. 192.11. 
63. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at arts. 1(1)(4), 194(5). 
64. See id. 
65. Virginia Commentary, supra note 56, at para. 192. 
66. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 194(3); BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 30, at 387–88. 
67. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at arts. 207, 211. 
68. Id. at arts. 61, 117–119. 
69. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, ¶ 17.1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. II) (Aug. 12, 1992). 
70. Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 28. 
71. Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling 
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter UNFSA]. 
72. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 30, at 384–86. 
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coastal State for its exclusive economic zone . . . constitute an integral element in 
the protection and preservation of the marine environment.”73 The obligation to 
protect and preserve the marine environment includes human activities other than 
those causing pollution. 
To conclude, the object of the obligation of States is the marine 
environment—both its physical and biological components. It is neither defined by 
specific human activities nor by their effects. Consequently, all States are duty 
holders as activities under their jurisdiction or control may affect the marine 
environment. They are also the beneficiaries. The protection and preservation of 
the marine environment are, according to the preamble of UNCLOS, in “the 
interests and needs of mankind as a whole.”74 The reference to mankind suggests 
that protection of the marine environment is not only about promoting national 
interests but also about community interests. 
Thus, the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment under 
UNCLOS requires States to exercise environmental stewardship. Since stewardship 
is about addressing collective concerns, it is to be conducted through cooperation, 
establishing some form of legal framework to address these problems.75 UNCLOS 
sets out a general obligation of cooperation.76 States are to cooperate in 
“formulating and elaborating international rules, standards and recommended 
practices and procedures.”77 The geographical scope and format of the cooperation 
depend on the issue at hand. The cooperative stewardship is to be conducted on a 
source-based approach. The UNCLOS includes detailed rules on the competence 
of the Authority to regulate mining in the deep sea but provides more of a general 
framework for regulating other human activities that may lead to pollution of the 
marine environment.78 With respect to vessel source pollution, the “competent 
international organization”—the International Maritime Organization (IMO)—is 
charged with establishing globally applicable international rules and standards to 
prevent pollution from vessels and to re-examine these from time to time.79 The 
strength of the collective stewardship may vary. One of the challenges recognized 
in recent years is how to ensure a more holistic or ecosystem-based approach to the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment when the present legal 
 
73. Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission 
(SRFC), Case No. 21, Advisory Opinion of Apr. 2, 2015, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/
documents/cases/case_no.21/advisory_opinion/C21_AdvOp_02.04.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V8E2-49KF]; see also Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Cases 3 and 
4, Order of Aug. 27, 1999, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no_3_4/
Order.27.08.99.E.pdf [https://perma.cc/CN93-WX8F]. 
74. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at pmbl. 
75. Brunnée, supra note 31, at 567. 
76. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 197. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at art. 194(4); cf. id. at arts. 207–12. 
79. Id. at art. 211(1). 
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regimes are sectoral and delimited on the basis of territorial jurisdiction.80 
A necessary element of environmental stewardship is the right of the 
beneficiaries to ensure that the duty bearers fulfill their responsibilities.81 The 
challenge is that the States (in capacity as coastal States, flag States, or port States) 
are both stewards and duty bearers.82 With the exception of the Authority, the 
institutional arrangements, set up to implement the obligation to cooperate, do not 
provide for a clear distinction between the two roles by assuming a separate 
stewardship.83 The States still are the stewards. The right of a port State under 
UNCLOS to take enforcement measures in respect of foreign-flagged vessels for 
violations of international rules and standards in areas beyond its national 
jurisdiction is an example of enforcement of community interest.84 The port State 
may take enforcement measures with respect to a foreign-flagged vessel voluntarily 
in one of its ports for illegal discharges of pollution even if the violation has not 
taken place in its exclusive economic zone or territorial sea.85 However, it is more 
adequate to describe this as an exercise of stewardship. The port State is in fact 
assisting the flag State in enforcing its obligations under UNCLOS. 
The obligations of a State towards the international community are described 
as erga omnes obligations.86 This means that all States have a legitimate interest in 
how States are complying with this obligation. The obligations of the stewards are 
such norms. The obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment 
probably qualifies as an erga omnes obligation.87 Part XV of UNCLOS on dispute 
settlement provides the beneficiaries with means to ensure that the stewards fulfill 
their responsibilities.88 Part XV is applicable to disputes under Part XII on 
protection and preservation of the marine environment. It does not necessarily 
entitle any State to bring a case of violation before an international tribunal or 
court.89 This is particularly evident where the effects of inadequate stewardship do 
not set identifiable marks. Then, other types of procedures for ensuring compliance 
with stewardship responsibilities may be more effective. They include the 
compliance and enforcement procedures established under the different multilateral 
 
80. See Yoshifumi Tanaka, Zonal and Integrated Management Approaches to Ocean Governance: 
Reflections on a Dual Approach in International Law of the Sea, 19 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 483,  
483–84 (2004). 
81. Barritt, supra note 19, at 7. 
82. BARNES, supra note 14, at 297–98. 
83. Id. at 298. 
84. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 218; Brunnée, supra note 31, at 558; Tanaka, supra note 30, at 
350–51. 
85. Brunnée, supra note 31, at 558. 
86. Jochen A. Frowein, Obligations Erga Omnes, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶¶ 1, 3 (2015). 
87. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 66 
(2001); BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 30, at 131, 234. 
88. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at arts. 279–99. 
89. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 30, at 233. 
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environmental agreements.90 These procedures may include regular reporting 
obligations on national implementation to be assessed by the treaty bodies and the 




E. Living Marine Resources 
The establishment of 200 nautical miles of exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 
meant a radical extension of the jurisdiction of coastal States over living marine 
resources. Approximately 90% of the harvest of living marine resources is 
undertaken within 200 nautical miles.91 The coastal States were considered better 
managers than the regional fisheries management organizations established for the 
high seas.92 Under UNCLOS, the coastal State enjoys sovereign rights for the 
purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the living marine 
resources of its EEZ.93 In addition to harvested fish stocks, living marine resources 
include dependent and associated species.94 It has exclusive competence to regulate 
access to the harvest of the living marine resources and to regulate how the harvest 
is to be performed. Still, this does not give the coastal State status as a proprietor.95 
Under certain conditions it is obligated to give other States access to its living marine 
resources.96 Furthermore, the coastal State has obligations to conserve the living 
marine resources within its EEZ and to cooperate with other States on conservation 
when fish stocks are transboundary.97 Other States are entitled to invoke the dispute 
settlement procedures of UNCLOS Part XV where the coastal State has violated its 
conservation obligation or the obligation to permit other States to fish in its EEZ.98 
Therefore, it may be more natural to describe the coastal States as being stewards 
than proprietors.99 An argument against describing it as stewardship is the wide 
discretion of the coastal State in determining the right of access and the restrictions 
on the use of dispute settlement procedures.100 The potential beneficiaries have 
 
90. SANDS ET AL., supra note 26, at 135–59. 
91. R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 288–89 (3d ed. 1999). 
92. Id. 
93. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 56(1)(a). 
94. Id. at art. 61(4). 
95. A.V. LOWE, Reflections on the Waters Changing Conceptions of Property Rights in the Law of the Sea, 
1 INT’L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 1, 7–9 (1986); see also Sand, supra note 17, at 48–49. 
96. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 62(2). 
97. Id. at arts. 61(2), 63, 64. 
98. Id. at arts. 286–296; cf. id. at art. 297(3) (explaining the limitations on the applicability of  
arts. 286–296). 
99. See MARGARET A. YOUNG, TRADING FISH, SAVING FISH: THE INTERACTION BETWEEN 
REGIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37 (2011); Richard Barnes, The Convention on the Law of the Sea: An 
Effective Framework for Domestic Fisheries Conservation?, in THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND 
PROSPECTS 246 (David Freestone et al. eds., 2006). 
100. See, e.g., Donald McRae & Gordon Munro, Coastal State “Rights” Within the 200-Mile Exclusive 
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limited opportunities to hold the coastal State responsible. In any case, the fact that 
the coastal State has an international legal obligation to ensure that the living marine 
resources of its EEZ are not endangered by over-exploitation indicates it has an 
environmental stewardship role.101 The obligation is now recognized, as referred to 
above, to be part of the obligations of States to protect the marine environment.102 
In areas beyond national jurisdiction, such as on the high seas, all States are 
entitled to exercise the freedom of fishing.103 The freedom is subjected to several 
conditions, including the obligations to conserve the living marine resources and to 
cooperate with relevant coastal States and other States fishing on the high seas.104 
The obligations are owed to a larger community, not only to the States actually 
exercising the freedom.105 The high seas are a global commons or common property 
similar to the Area. Consequently, environmental stewardship may be an 
appropriate description of the regulatory regime established under UNCLOS. In 
contrast to the Area, there is no single regime (like the Authority) competent to 
regulate access to the resources and to regulate the harvest for the conservation of 
the living marine resources and the protection of the marine environment. 
States are to cooperate through regional fisheries management organizations 
(RFMOs) on the conservation and management of living marine resources.106 The 
RFMOs, normally intergovernmental organizations, are set up under a treaty 
competent to adopt legally binding conservation and management measures (e.g., 
on total allowable catches, by-catch and other technical regulations, allocation of 
national quotas, and enforcement schemes).107 The obligation is less stringent than 
with respect to the Area, as States are not required to become members of RFMOs 
to access the high seas fisheries.108 The obligation of non-members of conservation 
is not well defined. However, under the FSA, the RFMOs are accorded an exclusive 
competence to regulate fishing activities within their regulatory area. Nonmembers 
are required to agree to apply the conservation measures adopted by the RFMOs to 
be entitled to access the regulated fisheries.109 This will strengthen the erga omnes 
 
Economic Zone, in RIGHTS BASED FISHING 97, 104 (Philip A. Neher et al. eds., 1989). 
101. TANAKA, supra note 30, at 366–67 (arguing that the conservation measures of the coastal 
State primarily are affected by its own interests, which does not suggest a stewardship role). 
102. Brunnée, supra note 31, at art. 567. 
103. UNCLOS, supra note 6, at art. 87(1)(e). 
104. Id. at arts. 117–119. 
105. See Turnipseed et al., supra note 10, 365–79. 
106. For an overview of RFMOs, see FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS, fao.org/fishery/rfb/search/en (select this hyperlink; then search text field HTML 
input box to browse through the collection of Regional Fishery Body fact sheets). 
107. EVELYNE MELTZER, THE QUEST FOR SUSTAINABLE INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES: 
REGIONAL EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT THE 1995 UNITED NATIONS FISH STOCK AGREEMENT: AN 
OVERVIEW FOR THE MAY 2006 REVIEW 56 n.43, 66 (2009). 
108.  See Rosemary Rayfuse, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 439, 441–42 (Donald R. Rothwell et al. eds., 2015). 
109.  UNFSA, supra note 71, at art. 8(4). 
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character of the conservation obligations.110 Further, the RFMOs have been 
accorded an extensive competence in ensuring compliance with their regulations. 
The high seas fisheries regime has gained a clearer cooperative stewardship 
character. The FSA provides for dispute settlement procedures for beneficiaries—
fishing as well as non-fishing States—to ensure that the responsibilities are carried 
out according to UNCLOS and FSA.111 
F. Preliminary Conclusion 
As pointed out by Mary Turnipseed,112 States have accepted their role as 
stewards of the oceans through the Future We Want, the outcome of the 2012 United 
Nations Conference on Sustainable Development: 
We therefore commit to protect, and restore, the health, productivity and 
resilience of oceans and marine ecosystems, and to maintain their 
biodiversity, enabling their conservation and sustainable use for present 
and future generations, and to effectively apply an ecosystem approach and 
the precautionary approach in the management, in accordance with 
international law, of activities having an impact on the marine 
environment, to deliver on all three dimensions of sustainable 
development.113 
Environmental stewardship remains, for now, more a description of, or an 
approach to, the legal responsibilities (the duality of rights and obligations) with 
respect to the environment than a legal norm. It may still have a legal character in 
the sense that it requires States to include a broad set of values and interests in their 
environmental politics and to look beyond sectors and jurisdictions. This is 
particularly important because of the need for more holistic and integrated 
approaches to environmental protection. 
III. ARCTIC ENVIRONMENTAL STEWARDSHIP 
A. Overview 
The 2008 Ilulissat Declaration by the five Arctic coastal States set the stage 
for this Article. The coastal States have described themselves as stewards, implying 
both a right and a duty to protect the “unique ecosystem” of the Arctic Ocean.114 
It is their sovereign rights and jurisdiction over parts of the Ocean that give them a 
“unique position to address these possibilities and challenges.”115 Their 
geographical nearness to the Ocean legitimatizes their special responsibilities or 
stewardship. However, they recognize that other States have legitimate rights and 
 
110.  Brunnée, supra note 31, at 558–59. 
111.  UNFSA, supra note 71, at arts. 27–32. 
112.  Turnipseed et al., supra note 10, at 366. 
113.  G.A. Res. 66/288, ¶ 158 ( July 27, 2012). 
114.  Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 1, at 1. 
115. Id. 
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interests in the use and protection of the Arctic Ocean. 
Does the stewardship concept have a substantive meaning as suggested in the 
previous section? Alternatively, is it merely a “tool designed to shore up their own 
special claims in and over the region” as argued by some?116 The following section 
investigates if and how environmental stewardship is exercised in the Arctic Ocean. 
More specifically, who are the respondents to the common concerns—the 
stewards? Do they include entities other than the coastal States?117 Oran R. Young 
describes Arctic Stewardship as “a way of thinking” on developing a coherent 
discourse.118 
The practice of the Arctic coastal States, and of the Arctic Council, will be 
investigated. The rationale behind focusing on the Arctic coastal States and the 
Arctic Council is a presumption that they may have a stronger sense of stewardship 
due to their nearness and dependency on a healthy marine environment. Further, 
the Arctic Council was established to promote cooperation on the protection of the 
Arctic environment. Franklyn Griffiths argues that the Arctic Council may be the 
principle locus for cooperative stewardship.119 Other States and institutions are 
entitled and required to exercise environmental stewardship with regard to the 
Arctic marine environment. Non-Arctic States have rights to navigate, undertake 
marine scientific research, and fish in Arctic marine waters. With these rights come 
the responsibilities under UNCLOS and obligations under different multilateral 
environmental agreements. Further, activities under these States’ jurisdiction in 
areas beyond the Arctic region may affect the Arctic marine environment. The 
major threats to the Arctic marine environment, such as the impacts of climate 
change, are caused by activities outside of the Arctic. Thus, the States’ obligations 
with regard to emissions of greenhouse gases or other long-range pollutants may be 
described as part of Arctic environmental stewardship. In this Article, the focus is 
on the Arctic itself. The involvement of other States and the relationship to other 
international regimes will be included in the investigation of the Arctic Council. 
B. The Arctic Coastal States and Environmental Stewardship 
Some of the coastal States have claimed a stewardship role in their Arctic 
policies.120 The Ilulissat declaration indicated, however, a collective stewardship 
 
116. Page Wilson, Society, Steward or Security Actor? Three Visions of the Arctic Council, 51 
COOPERATION & CONFLICT 55, 62 (2016). 
117. Id. at 6–7. 
118. Oran R. Young, Arctic Stewardship: Maintaining Regional Resilience in an Era of Global Change, 
26 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 407, 408 (2012). 
119. Franklyn Griffiths, Stewardship as Concept and Practice in an Arctic Context 5–6 (Cyber 
Dialogue 2012: What is Stewardship in Cyberspace?, Conference Paper, 2012) at 5–6,  
http://www.cyberdialogue.citizenlab.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/2012papers/CyberDialogue 
2012_Griffiths.pdf [https://perma.cc/MC25-XB2C]. 
120. Wilson, supra note 116, at 7. 
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role.121 Its focus on the unique ecosystem of the Arctic Ocean suggested that the 
coastal States apply an ecocentric approach to the protection of the marine 
environment of the region.122 At the 2010 Arctic Coastal States Meeting in Chelsea, 
Canada, this responsibility was expanded to include the Arctic’s potential resources: 
“Managed sustainably and through good stewardship, these resources can 
contribute to economic prosperity and social well-being, including for indigenous 
peoples, for generations to come.”123 The establishment of the “Arctic 5” forum 
was controversial as it was viewed as undermining the Arctic Council.124 The issues 
highlighted by the coastal States, such as strengthening the measures regulating 
Arctic shipping and search and rescue capabilities and increasing the capacity of 
pollution preparedness, response, and scientific cooperation, have been channelled 
through or undertaken under the purview of the Arctic Council.125 
The cooperation between the Arctic 5 has, in recent years, concentrated on 
the regime for regulation of fishing activities on the high seas of the Central Arctic 
Ocean. In July 2015, they signed the Declaration Concerning the Prevention of 
Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central Arctic Ocean.126 Here, they commit 
themselves only to license vessels flying their flag to engage in commercial fishing 
on the high seas where there is an RFMO competent to regulate the fishing 
activities.127 In starting these talks, they identified themselves as “the States whose 
exclusive economic zones border the high seas area in question to take the initiative 
on this matter.”128 Contrary to the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, they did not describe 
 
121. See Ilulissat Declaration, supra note 1, at 2. 
122. Id. 
123. Lawrence Cannon, Foreign Affairs Minister of Canada, Summary of Arctic Ocean Coastal 
States Meeting (Mar. 29, 2010), www.arctic-report.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/2010.03-Arctic-
Ocean-Coastal-States-meeting-Chelsea-Canada-March-2p010.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KFM-8NCQ]. 
124. WEIDEMANN, supra note 5, at 61; see also Press Release, Iceland Protests a Meeting of Five 
Arctic Council Member States in Canada (Feb. 18, 2010), http://www.mfa.is/news-and-publications/
nr/5434 [https://perma.cc/CXE2-ZNBA]. 




archive/843-arctic-council-works-to-prevent-arctic-marine-oil-pollution] (Mar. 4, 2014) (discussing 
strengthening of the shipping industries); Nuuk Prepares to Welcome Ministers, ARCTIC COUNCIL,  
http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/resources/news-and-press/news-archive/131-
nuuk-prepares-to-welcom-ministers [http://www.arctic-council.org/index.php/en/resources/
news-and-press/news-archive/131-nuuk-prepares-to-welcom-ministers] (May 12, 2011) 
(discussing strengthening search and rescue between the Arctic States); EPPR, eppr.arctic-council.org 
[https://perma.cc/38V7-FH56] (last visited Apr. 13, 2016) (discussing the group’s aim at pollution 
preparedness and response). 
126. Declaration Concerning the Prevention on Unregulated High Seas Fishing in the Central 
Arctic Ocean, Can.-Den.-Nor.-Russ.-U.S., July 16, 2015, https://www.regjeringen.no/globalassets/ 
departementene/ud/vedlegg/folkerett/declaration-on-arctic-fisheries-16-july-2015.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/8M7D-EEG9] [hereinafter Declaration Concerning High Seas Fishing]. 
127. See id. 
128. Chairman’s Statement from Meeting on Arctic Fisheries (Feb. 24–26, 2014), 
http://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/News/2014/02/Arktisk-hoejsoefiskeri (follow 
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themselves as stewards.129 The reason may be that the initiative concerned the high 
seas areas of the Central Arctic Ocean, which are beyond their jurisdiction. The 
commitments of the 2015 Declaration are reasoned on the “crucial role of healthy 
marine ecosystems and sustainable fisheries for food and nutrition” and in the 
“interests of Arctic residents, particularly the Arctic indigenous peoples, in the 
proper management of living marine resources in the Arctic Ocean.”130 There is no 
reference to stewardship. The Declaration also does not imply an ecocentric 
stewardship role for the coastal States. On the contrary, it clearly sends a signal that 
the Central Arctic Ocean is not to be considered a marine reserve. It is interesting 
to note that the same States in respect of the 1973 Polar Bear Agreement have 
recognized their “special responsibilities and special interests in relation to the 
protection of the fauna and flora of the Arctic Region.”131 Young argues that it is 
“easier to make a case that harm to species or ecosystems are actionable when they 
have obvious consequences for human welfare.”132 The coastal States have done no 
more than comply with their obligation not to allow vessels flying their flag to be 
involved in fishing activities on the high seas unless there is some organization or 
arrangement competent to regulate fishing.133 In that sense, they are exercising an 
element of environmental stewardship. 
C. Arctic Council and Environmental Stewardship 
From the founding document of the Arctic Council, the Ottawa Declaration, 
environmental protection is one of the central common concerns of the Arctic 
States.134 The Arctic Council is set up as a high-level forum for “promoting 
cooperation, coordination and interaction . . . on common Arctic issues, in particular 
issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.”135 
In addition to the five Arctic coastal States, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland are also 
members of the Arctic Council. NGOs representing Arctic indigenous peoples have 
status as permanent participants.136 
The Arctic Council does not have international personality. Further, it is not 
competent to adopt decisions that are binding on its member States.137 Page Wilson 
describes it as a “society of sovereign States”—a forum to discuss common interests 
 
“Chairman’s Statement from Nuuk Meeting February 2014” hyperlink). 
129. See Declaration Concerning High Seas Fishing, supra note 126. 
130. Id. at 1. 
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133. See UNFSA, supra note 71, at art. 18. 
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U.S., Sept. 19, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 1387 (1996). 
135. Id. at 2. 
136. Permanent Participants, ARCTIC COUNCIL (last updated Feb. 22, 2016), http://www.arctic-
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of the region.138 The Arctic Council is not competent, according to Griffiths, to 
“negotiate measures of cooperative stewardship.”139 This does not promote it as a 
(separate) steward. 
The Arctic Council—through its working groups—has mainly been involved 
in producing scientific-synthesis reports on the main pollution problems, including 
climate change threatening the Arctic environment and its ecosystems.140 The 
scientific information provided was important in developing the 2001 Stockholm 
Persistent Pollution Convention.141 The Arctic Council has had a policy-shaping 
role within and beyond the Arctic, which should not be underestimated. It has been 
accorded a more active role in recent years as the focus has broadened to include 
adaptation to effects of climate change, such as how to deal with possible negative 
effects on increased maritime activities in the marine Arctic like shipping and 
petroleum activities.142 Two legal instruments have been negotiated under the 
auspices of the Arctic Council: the 2011 Search and Rescue Agreement143 and the 
2013 Arctic Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response Agreement.144 Other task 
forces have been established by the Arctic Council, including research cooperation 
and cooperative arrangements for oil pollution prevention, which may lead to legally 
binding agreements.145 The two agreements were initiated at the recommendation 
of the 2009 Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment (AMSA), commissioned and 
approved by the Arctic Council.146 Another AMSA recommendation was the 
adoption of mandatory requirements for vessels operating in Arctic waters through 
the IMO.147 The Polar Code, including mandatory elements, was adopted in Spring 
2015 and will enter into force in January 2017.148 
 
138. Id. at 2. 
139. Griffiths, supra note 119, at 6. 
140. Timo Koivurova et al., Innovative Environmental Protection: Lessons from the Arctic, 27 J. ENVTL. 
L., 285, 293–94 (2015); Svein Vigeland Rottem, A Note on the Arctic Council Agreements, 46 OCEAN DEV. 
& INT’L L. 50, 51–52 (2015). 
141. Koivurova et al., supra note 140, at 297–98. 
142. Id. at 307. 
143. Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic, 
Arctic Council, Can.-Den.-Fin.-Ice.-Nor.-Russ.-Swed.-U.S., May 12, 2011, http://www.arctic-
council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/category/20-main-documents-from-nuuk (follow 
“Arctic_SAR_Agreement_EN_FINAL_for_signature_21-Apr-2011.pdf” hyperlink). 
144. Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the 
Arctic, Arctic Council, Can.-Den.-Fin.-Ice.-Nor.-Russ.-Swed.-U.S., May 15, 2013, http://www.arctic-
council.org/eppr/agreement-on-cooperation-on-marine-oil-pollution-preparedness-and-response-in-
the-arctic/ (follow “Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution, Preparedness and Response 
in the Arctic” hyperlink). 
145. See Task Forces of the Arctic Council, ARCTIC COUNCIL, www.arctic-council.org/
index.phb/en/about-us/working-groups/task-forces [https://perma.cc/X8PS-CB74] (last updated 
Sept. 9, 2015). 
146. Arctic Council, Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report 6–7 (2009),  
http://pame.is/images/03_Projects/AMSA/AMSA_2009_report/AMSA_2009_Report_2nd_print.
pdf [https://perma.cc/2T3R-SSBW]. 
147. Id. at 6. 
148. Int’l Maritime Org. [IMO], MEPC 68/21/Add.1, International Code for Ships Operating 
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Even if the Arctic Council has become more active, it is still not conducting 
cooperative or autonomous stewardship, but rather, a restricted form of 
stewardship. The Arctic Council has not described itself as having a stewardship 
role, either. The Arctic Council is portrayed by Griffiths as undertaking “a host of 
related but separated activities that have yet to be linked . . . .”149 Rather, its work 
could be described as instructive for the Arctic States in their efforts to fulfill their 
stewardship responsibilities.150 
The States are required to cooperate at an appropriate level to develop 
necessary rules and standards to protect the marine environment.151 States have 
wide discretion under UNCLOS on how to institutionalize their common 
responsibilities. The regional level may be appropriate for taking initiative on 
developments within competent international organizations such as the IMO.152 
The coastal States of the region bear a special responsibility for providing 
infrastructure to the shipping industry. It was therefore natural that the agreements 
on search-and-rescue and on oil pollution preparedness and response were adopted 
through the Arctic Council.153 The same is applicable to the obligation to cooperate 
on research programs, on marine pollutions, and on monitoring of marine 
pollution.154 
The 2013 Kiruna Vision for the Arctic155 and the 2015–2025 Arctic Marine 
Strategy Plan (AMSP)156 may provide insight into how the Arctic States plan to 
execute their common responsibility in the coming years and the role accorded to 
the Arctic Council. The instruments do not set out a clear division of responsibility 
between the Arctic Council and the member States. Under the AMSP, “the Arctic 
Council provides strong institutional support for the stewardship of the Arctic 
marine environment.”157 Under the Vision, the Arctic Council is to be strengthened, 
as the States shall “pursue opportunities to expand the Arctic Council’s roles from 
policy-shaping into policy-making.”158 The negotiations and adoption of the 
abovementioned agreements under its auspices may be examples of such new role. 
 
in Polar Waters (Nov. 21, 2014), http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/HotTopics/polar/Pages/
default.aspx. 
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Among the tasks or objectives is to improve knowledge and understanding of the 
Arctic, inside and outside the region.159 The knowledge does not only include 
natural science, important under the AMSP. It also includes knowledge on possible 
ways of strengthening the governance of the region, which was provided by the 
Arctic Ocean Review.160 A healthy Arctic environment is the priority task and 
objective; it is achieved by applying an ecosystem-based approach to management, 
which balances conservation and sustainable use, for the well being of present and 
future generations.161 Further, there is a focus on how to address climate change 
and its impacts both at the local and international level.162 The AMSP highlights the 
Arctic Council as a forum for regional and international cooperation on scientific 
research. Scientific research is important to inform decision-making. The Arctic 
States declared that “there is no problem that we cannot solve together through our 
cooperative relationships on the basis of existing international law and good will.”163 
This statement suggests that the Arctic Council could be used for specifying and 
implementing their common responsibilities, including through undertaking more 
specific legal obligations. They are to exercise “leadership in regional and global 
forums to address challenges affecting our home.”164 This may include working 
through the IMO bodies to adopt ships’ routing measures to protect vulnerable 
areas of the marine Arctic and through the UN Framework Convention on Climate 
Change to have new restrictions adopted on emission of greenhouse gases. It 
remains to be seen if the Arctic States exercise such coordinated stewardship as their 
interests may not be identical. 
Non-Arctic States have responsibilities for the protection and preservation of 
the Arctic marine environment and the conservation of its living marine 
resources.165 As the Arctic Council developed during the early 2000s, there was an 
increased interest among non-Arctic States to become observers in the Arctic 
Council.166 It was seen as a way of influencing Arctic governance.167 The criteria for 
becoming an observer State have been revised in recent years.168 The conditions are 
set to ensure that the observers do not bring in their own, and potentially 
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conflicting, agendas into the work of the Arctic Council.169 They have to document 
both the capability and willingness to cooperate as well as to recognize that the law 
of the sea provides the international legal framework.170 Interestingly, their efforts 
in “bringing Arctic concerns to global decision-making bodies” would help qualify 
for and maintain the status of observer.171 By taking part in and contributing to the 
work of the Arctic Council and its working groups, the non-Arctic States are 
provided with insights and knowledge about environmental challenges, which may 
be addressed by relevant international organizations of which they are members 
(such as the IMO). When non-Arctic States have firsthand knowledge about the 
environmental challenges, it may facilitate for adoption of necessary regulations 
within relevant international organizations and multilateral environmental 
agreements. 
D. Assessment 
It is the Arctic States and, in particular, the Arctic coastal States that are 
conducting Arctic marine stewardship. The Arctic Council is more an instrument 
for the Arctic States than an independent actor. The stewardship concept has not 
been used frequently after the Ilulissat Declaration. This indicates that it was used 
more as rhetoric to legitimize the intervention of the Arctic coastal States when the 
region attracted international attention. However, the Arctic States have exercised 
common responsibility, partly through the two above-mentioned agreements, 
initiating or supporting processes within other legal regimes, and through the policy-
shaping tasks of the Arctic Council. However, when exercising practical 
responsibility beyond intervening in emergencies and distress at sea (cf. the two 
Arctic agreements), they seem less inclined to specify these responsibilities. Their 
responsibilities are referred to in general terms such as ecosystem-based 
management. The introduction by the United States of “Arctic Ocean Safety, 
Security and Stewardship” as one of the themes for its chairmanship may change 
that.172 A task force was established to assess the needs for a regional seas program 
or similar program for increased cooperation in Arctic marine areas.173 Another 
example of reluctance to specify the environmental stewardship follows from one 
of the AMSA recommendations: the Arctic coastal States were asked to harmonize 
their regulations of shipping within their own jurisdiction with the mandatory 
 
169. Graczyk & Koivurova, supra note 166, at 229, 232, 234. 
170. Arctic Council, Rules of Procedure, annex 2, paras. (2)(a), 6 (2013), https://oaarchive.arctic-
council.org/bitstream/handle/11374/940/2015-09-01_Rules_of_Procedure_website_version.pdf. 
171. Id. at para. (6)(g). 
172. U.S. Dep’t of State, U.S. Chairmanship of the Arctic Council, STATE.GOV, 
http://www.state.gov/e/oes/ocns/opa/arc/uschair/index.htm (last visited Sept. 9, 2015). 
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regulations to be developed through IMO.174 Following the entry-into-force of the 
Polar Code in 2017, there may be more focus on this issue. The increased 
participation of non-Arctic States in the work of the Arctic Council may also 
contribute to highlighting the performance by the Arctic States of their self-





Critical voices argue that Arctic stewardship is used to support sovereign 
claims of the Arctic States.175 The assessment of the relevant UNCLOS provisions 
suggests that environmental stewardship is a proper description of the 
responsibilities of States to address the common challenges to the marine 
environment. The problem in regard to stewardship is its framework character and 
sectoral approach. UNCLOS does not instruct a clear, collective stewardship, but 
leaves it to the relevant States to organize. Still, the concept may have an important 
function—even not as a legal concept—in highlighting the common or collective 
responsibility of States in respect to the world community to protect and preserve 
the environment (including the living marine resources), particularly important to 
address global challenges such as climate change and loss of biodiversity. The 
argument for, and exercise of, Arctic environmental stewardship has been 
legitimizing the maritime claims of States. Protection of the Arctic marine 
environment is on the agenda, and there is recognition of the need for specific 
measures to implement the more general obligations of UNCLOS, by the Arctic 
States themselves and through relevant international bodies. However, the work has 
been influenced by the character of UNCLOS. The groups of duty bearers are larger 
than the Arctic five or eight. It is natural that the States of the Arctic Region that 
are directly affected by the environmental consequences of inaction take the 
initiatives, including through the Arctic Council. The Arctic Council has become an 
important instrument to put the Arctic, in general, and its marine environment, in 
particular, on the international agenda. However, is this enough to ensure that all 
States take their stewardship role seriously? Particularly the non-Arctic States? 
Involving them in the Arctic is as important as speaking the case of the Arctic in 
different international fora. 
 
 
174. Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment 2009 Report, supra note 146, § (I)(C). 
175. Wilson, supra note 116, at 7. 
